

THE CHAPLAIN
and
CIVIL AFFAIRS MILITARY GOVERNMENT
in
OCCUPIED AREAS

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THE CHAPLAIN AND CAMG IN OCCUPIED AREAS

The purpose of this study is to determine requirements for chaplain staff assistance and religious coverage for CAMG (Civil Affairs/Military Government) activities in any future operation and, if additional action is deemed necessary, to recommend courses of action to be followed.

An effort will be made to assemble certain selected and well documented data relevant to the subject from available sources; to analyze this material with view to finding whether deficiencies existed due to the lack of chaplain services in past CAMG operations; to look at present CAMG concepts in the light of possible future needs; and finally, to suggest ways of using the chaplain in meeting these needs.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The concept of military government is not new in our Armed Forces. We have used it in some form or degree and tailored it to meet our needs as they occurred for more than a century. Hajo Holborn attributes to the Army due credit when he says,

Since 1846, when the Army introduced democratic government into New Mexico, it had frequently administered control of civilian populations. . . . More often, however, American military government followed in the wake of military operations and had a political rather than military mission. This happened after the Civil and Spanish American Wars and World War I. In 1918 American troops were exercising control over parts of Siberia, Dalmatia, and the Rhine-lands. But all these earlier experiences of the U. S. Army

were dwarfed by the gigantic and enormously complex tasks posed by World War II. ¹.

Prior to this war CAMG activities were performed on a rather simple basis. The commander saw problems to be solved involving civilians and detailed selected officers and men to take care of them. Some occasionally were assigned on a semi-permanent basis but little provision was made for their training or consideration given to their background for the job. The problems were comparatively simple so this approach proved adequate.

With the coming of Pearl Harbor our first task was to get combat troops into the field to win a war. As this program progressed it soon became apparent that adequate provisions had to be made for handling civilian populations and their economies. Military government must assume a significant role in winning the war and establishing the final peace. Whether a smooth transition from a state of occupation to an era of lasting peace would be accomplished, or whether the seeds of resentment and animosity would be sown which would spring up into a harvest of future conflict, was largely a matter of the policy and activity of military government. The necessary personnel were not available. It was a bigger task than commissioning experts in foreign relations direct from civilian life. We didn't have the experts and some of those who could have been used were already busy in other tasks. Holborn, in discussing this situation, tells us,

. . . it was decided to select chiefly men with experience in American public administration and men

¹. See Holborn, Hajo, American Military Government, Infantry Journal Press, Washington, D. C., 1947, p 2.

technically skilled and send these men to a school of military government where they could be trained in organization and methods, and in the political and social institutions of foreign countries. The Secretary of War approved the plan to train officers for civil affairs and liaison in December 1941 and in May 1942 the school of Military Government began operating in Charlottesville, Virginia. ².

As the war progressed the needs for trained CAMG officers increased. The program was expanded to include a school at Fort Custer, Michigan, for the training of several hundred from both civilian life and military officers. After a month of study at Custer many were sent to CATS (Civilian Affairs Training Schools) on various campuses, including Harvard, Yale, Pittsburg, Boston, Michigan, Northwestern, Wisconsin and Stanford. At the peak of the program more than seven hundred officers were trained at Fort Custer in a single month and were sent on to the CATS schools.

In all these schools emphasis was placed on military skills and physical fitness. For some insight into the type of training given in the class room we are indebted to Harold Zink.

The curriculum at both Charlottesville and Custer-CATS combined general military indoctrination with courses intended to prepare officers for military government assignments. In the general military courses officers learned something of military law, military policing, military security, aircraft identification, the problem of supply, Army correspondence, the Army postal system, military courtesy, and almost everything else military in character. . . . The military government side of the curriculum consisted of instruction in the history of military government, public administration, and the people, geography, and institutions of the people of a certain area. . . . Though Charlottesville did little with language instruction during its early classes and perhaps never emphasized language a great deal, the CATS placed heavy stress on the

². Ibid, p 3.

study of the language of the area in which an officer expected to be assigned. . . .

With military government officers in Germany having to cope with concrete problems of a highly complicated character in such fields as German political structure, legal system and courts, religious affairs,* education, transportation, communications, trade and industry, and food and agriculture, what was especially needed was areal instruction in these specialized realms rather than general knowledge of the history of the country. 3.

PROBLEMS

The historically incidental considerations given to military government in our total war plans prior to WWII was reflected in certain weaknesses in our occupation, especially in Germany. In chapter 3 of his book, Zink discusses these matters and I shall attempt to sum them up because of their bearing on the problem. 4.

1. Military government as a civilian component concept proved only half effective. In the combat stage these teams were attached to the commands from division level up and were utilized within the commander's concept, which varied greatly between the divisions, the the corps, and the armies. When the combat stage was over and things could settle down and have a firm policy established and followed, large numbers of these trained specialists were ready to go home.

2. Further complicating the whole problem was the arrival of a number of generals and "legion" of full colonels for duty with military government, especially U. S. Groups, Control Council for Germany. Let Zink describe it.

General officers became so numerous that one could not shake the proverbial stick without hitting one, while 'chicken' colonels became almost as commonplace as privates.

* Underline is mine

3. See Zink, Harold, American Military Government in Germany, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947, pp 9, 12.

4. Ibid, Chapter 3.

. . . After V-E Day large numbers of generals and full colonels in the United States found their work more or less finished. . . . Apparently they figured that the military government field offered the best chances of holding their temporary ranks. So they pulled every string known in Army circles to get assigned to Germany, and many succeeded.

Inasmuch as these officers outranked the officers who for a year or more had been preparing for the big job in Germany, they automatically in most cases took over the chief positions, under the Army rule which bases such matters on rank. The senior officers who had ably headed the divisions and made careful preparations for the actual work to be done in Germany found that there was little or nothing left for them. The specialists on German problems farther down the line were so buried under the deluge of rank above that they found it increasingly difficult to cut across the red tape necessary to get anything accomplished and hence in many cases either gave up trying to do anything or if possible got out entirely. ⁵

While we acknowledge that this situation may have been exaggerated, we must also face the fact that between the civilian component officers who had to return to their normal peacetime pursuits and the large number of others who, seeing no opportunity for advancement and unable to make the best use of their training, got out, that we lost the majority of our specially trained military government officers at the time when we needed them most.

3. Represented among the military government officers were public health officers, social workers, forestry experts, agronomists, journalists, bankers, foreign service officers, public office holders, engineers, public utility experts, policemen, firemen, postal authorities, transportation directors, teachers, lawyers, wholesalers and retailers. Included among the journalists were publishers of large newspapers. Education was represented by a number of university

⁵ Zink, Ibid, p 30.

presidents and professors and by superintendents of metropolitan school systems. Many references are made to the absence from the staff of religious specialists and to the lack of adequate appreciation of the potential impact that might have been made by a religious specialist such as the chaplain. Two representative quotations will suffice.

The expertness of specialists officers naturally varied, but many of the original assignees at least displayed a very high degree of competence. In the case of religious affairs*lack of adequate recognition usually made necessary a side-line assignment to the education officer. 6.

Religious affairs might have received a great deal of attention, considering the American policy which permitted churches to hold services despite the general ban on German group meetings. But the powers that be never saw fit to authorize full-time religious affairs specialist officers even in the large military government detachments. Despite the unusually fine leadership in this field in higher headquarters, the general program as it related to religious affairs in the field was carried out quite casually by any officers who might be available. Few had any background for such duties and in the last analysis much depended upon the religious attitude of the senior military government officer. If he was favorably inclined toward the church and local churchmen proved at all cooperative, the relations of military government with the religious organizations were cordial. On the other hand, if the detachment commander had little use for religious groups this attitude reflected itself in the relations existing between military government and the German churches. This rather personal approach to the problem naturally left something to be desired. 7.

In the Far East"General MacArthur did not subscribe to the G5 * plan for Military Government as was employed by General Eisenhower in Europe. So what actually took place was the conversion of the entire

* Underline is mine

6. Zink, Ibid, p 59.

7. Ibid, p 114.

General Headquarters into a military government control headquarters". 8. Japan was a rare type of CAMG function where the established government was surrendered in tact and the Emperor retained as its head, subject to and executing the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander. In Germany the government was destroyed and the Fuehrer was dead. Those who had been part of his regime were in hiding and did not wish to be identified. In Korea after V-J Day the liberated Koreans demanded that all Japanese be sent back to their homeland at once. This demand was complied with. After the departure of the Japanese, who for forty years had not allowed the Koreans to occupy important positions in government, there was left neither a government nor a people trained to operate one. "Thus, almost from the beginning, military government in conquered Japan ✓ was indirect while that in liberated Korea was direct". 9. This was first administered through military government teams on the staff of the tactical commanders. After January 1946 the USMGIK (US Military Government in Korea) headquarters under the CGUSFIK (Commanding General United States Forces in Korea) operated the government. This organization was the government until May 1947, operated with the "South Korean Interim Government" from this time until 15 August 1948, and was dissolved after the South Koreans had adopted a constitution and elected a President and National Assembly.

When the Japanese Emperor announced the surrender to his people he asked all officials to remain at their posts and continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by SCAP

8. See SUBCOURSE NR. 20, "History of Civil Affairs and Military Government", CAMG School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, Lesson 8, p 10.

9. Ibid, p 5.

(Supreme Commander Allied Powers). The leadership proved very cooperative. SCAP brought in military personnel and set up special staff sections in GHQ to implement the CAMG policies. Among these the Civil Information and Education Section was charged with "public information, including press, radio, motion pictures and theater, and with education, religion,* fine arts and monuments". 10. This special staff drew up the implementing directives operating under the Chief of Staff, GHQ, who opposed establishing direct technical channels between those staff sections and their opposite numbers in the Regional and Prefectural teams.

Two references to religion in a SCAP directive dated 4 October 1945 come within our interest. This directive has been referred to as a virtual "Bill of Rights". It ordered release of prisoners and told the Japanese Government what it should do "in order to remove restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion". . . . It fixed the responsibility on "all officials and subordinates of the Japanese Government affected by the terms of this directive", and said they would be held "personally responsible and strictly accountable for compliance and adherence to the spirit and letter of this directive". As a result, "The Japanese Government abolished its secret police forces, police departments charged with censorship and other police agencies concerned with control of thought, speech, religion and assembly. Almost 5,000 members of the Japanese police system, including 100 top-ranking officials, were removed from office". 11.

* Underline is mine

10. SUBCOURSE NR. 20, Lesson 8, Ibid, p 9.

11. Ibid, pp 9-11.

Since this specially created staff section functioned directly under the Chief of Staff, it is assumed that its advice on religious matters was coordinated with the GHQ Chaplain. In Korea the Military Government Commander was a deputy to the CGUSAFIK. If located near enough, it is presumed that he utilized the services of the chaplain on the staff of CGUSAFIK. If at a great distance, he probably had a chaplain on his own staff.

It would be too much to expect that in any future conflict we might receive the surrender of a government intact such as we did in Japan. The need for chaplain service on a staff is always greater where a government has collapsed and the military must become the government as in Germany, or when the government has been dethroned as in Korea in 1945. Normally we expect clear-cut guidance on policy matters from higher headquarters. This usually comes but sometimes it doesn't. In the absence of such information, the commander in the field must decide. In the training phase our CAMG personnel were told that the German clergy had remained fairly independent of the Nazi regime and would therefore be a good source of help in the occupation. It was only natural that many of our detachments relied rather heavily on the advice of this group, usually with good results. Zink says,

Some of the assistance received from the German clergy was invaluable and should receive high credit. Unfortunately, some of the advice proved very unsound and led military government officers into extremely embarrassing situations. . . . The German clergy probably displayed more solid character than any other class. It is true that some of them had truckled to the Nazis, but a sizable proportion had exhibited considerable courage in refusing to capitulate to the most vicious demands of the Hitlerites. . . . Their counsel was not always reliable and in a good many instances led to more or less embarrassment on the part of the American military government. ¹².

¹². Zink, Op. Cit., pp 92, 247.

Perhaps the person best able to render assistance to the commander in such cases would be a well-trained chaplain of sound judgment, whose contacts with the local clergy might do much to incite loyalty and cooperation on the part of the clergy as well as to assist the commander in interpreting the motives actuating the clergy.

PRESENT CAMG CONCEPTS OF FUTURE NEEDS

Current thinking envisions that the reorganization of our tactical forces will increase the need for CAMG support. Senator Strom Thurmond's concept is summed up here because it seems typical of the thinking of many. ¹³. The future battlefield will be of much greater depth and width than ever before. On this field will be small combat battle groups of all arms, semi-independent, self contained, and capable of operating over extended distances for prolonged periods with minimum control and support from higher headquarters. They will have extreme mobility which will make them capable of assembling rapidly, striking hard and dispersing quickly. Some areas will be lightly held and between these may be great gaps which are occupied by civilians. Small self contained airborne units may be dropped into other sectors leaving further gaps filled with civilians. As the scope of warfare enlarges the commander's civilian problems will increase. Assistant Secretary of the Army, George H. Roderick, speaking on this subject says,

Among other requirements this points up the need for a greater CAMG capability than we have ever had. If our combat forces are to be effective, they must be assisted in the control of local populations. They must have avail-

¹³. See Thurmond, Strom, "CAMG Operations in Atomic Age Warfare", Military Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. 10, January 1958, pp 5-6.

able all of the resources of the area it is possible to obtain. Hence as we see the impact of new devices of war on the Army, and as we devote a greater part of our national effort to technological developments, the importance of CAMG functions in the national defense increases. 14.

In line with implementing this greatly enlarged concept of CAMG to aid the commander in better managing the civilian populace within his area of operation and occupation certain plans have been put into action by DA. The general staff has been expanded to allow a CAMG officer at general staff level.

At present the G5 is scheduled for all commands in the Army down to an including divisions.

Some current developments designed to back up the new G5 include the establishment of the CAMG School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, the development of doctrine and manuals, the establishment of CAMG Departments in the US Army Reserve Schools, the establishment of the CAMG Branch in the USAR, the CAMG specialization program for officers on active duty, the participation of CAMG staff sections and units in Army maneuvers and exercises, the provision of CAMG operations as an integral part of plans from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to division level, organization of CAMG Reserve units to meet foreseeable contingencies, provision of augmentation table staff sections for field army and below, and what is more important, the teaching of this doctrine to both Associate and Regular courses at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Present CAMG activities will give the US Army a corps of experienced officers and a file of appropriate doctrinal material. More important, they will give the field commander a trained 'ready to go' force to assist him in carrying out his civil-military responsibilities. 15.

THE CHAPLAIN IN CAMG

We come now to consider the relationship of the chaplain in the

14. See quotation from Assistant Secretary of the Army Roderick, in Military Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. 10, January 1958, p 8.

15. See Colonel Mrazek, James E., Inf., in "The Fifth Staff Officer", Military Review, Vol. XXXVI, No. 12, March 1957, p 51.

light of past CAMG operations, a greatly expanded concept of future needs, and a course of action to be followed in the training of selected chaplains to meet the requirements.

The study has established that past military government activities included specialists from practically every field except religion. Religious affairs were frequently handled by people who had little background for this task. Sideline assignments to other specialists, who were highly competent in their own line but poorly prepared to operate in the field of religion, were common. Mistakes and lack of wisdom in liaison with indigenous clergy have been all too frequent and sometimes embarrassing to commanders. In many cases the personal attitude of the commander toward religion has been the determining factor in our dealings with the churches. In some instances this has done us great credit. In others it has left much to be desired.

The training program of CAMG in the past, and especially during WWII, may also be used for our profit here. It has been shown that the best results are not to be obtained in terms of CAMG as a Reserve Component concept. This is adequate for the combat phase. But when the fighting is over and the opportunity for the contribution of CAMG in stabilizing the situation and laying the foundation for a lasting peace arrives, these people are ready to be demobilized and return to their civilian pursuits. We thus lose most of our specialists at the time of CAMG's greatest need.

Experience indicates the requirement for general knowledge of the history and culture of the country where CAMG may operate, but has further discovered the necessity for instructions in the particular specialty in which the officer will function as it relates to the

occupied area. A speaking knowledge of the language is essential for the best results.

Looking at the future battlefield as envisioned in Senator Thurmond's article and the increased need for CAMG support as stated by Assistant Secretary of the Army Roderick, we see the addition of a number of CAMG cellular teams, but there will not be a need for increasing the number of chaplains accordingly. These teams, platoons and companies will be attached to units already having chaplains and can be covered by these chaplains in the same manner as other small attachments are covered. However, there will be a necessity for all chaplains to be aware of their opportunity to advise these people on religious matters pertaining to the indigenous population and possibly to assist in liaison with the local clergy.

Therefore, the present and future training of chaplains should consider two courses of action for the maximum practical impact in any CAMG activity.

1. The CAMG course in the Chaplain School should be given to all chaplains, including the basic students. It is conceivable that some chaplains of little military experience, with training limited to the basic course, might suddenly find themselves assigned to units where CAMG personnel were operating and where chaplain assistance was needed. The problem is greater than merely providing religious coverage for CAMG personnel. In this respect CAMG personnel are merely a part of the chaplain's parish. But he must also be able to offer sound counsel on religious affairs as related to the indigenous people. The course should continue to give a general orientation in CAMG matters. But it should also be enlarged to give increased instructions in and emphasis to the chaplain's potential in the light of the expanding CAMG concept.

Senator Thurmond proposes that "all branch service schools must give greater emphasis to CAMG orientation". 16.

2. Certain selected chaplains of the active Army should have included in their career patterns some special training to fit them for assignment as staff chaplains in the headquarters of Military Government Commands. This training might include study in the advanced course at the Civil Affairs Military Government School, Fort Gordon, Georgia; a study of language and perhaps the Foreign Area Specialists Training course at the US Army Language School, Monterey, California; and a limited study in the culture, religious history, and political philosophy of any likely potential enemy country. While the latter part of this preparation might involve a year of study at some civilian university for one or more chaplains, it is believed it would pay great dividends in terms of assistance to the military government commander at the theater headquarters. He would have the benefit of expert advice in the field of religion as he sought to implement the policies of his government and weigh the military necessity against the balancing CAMG principle of consideration for humanity. A chaplain of this stature and status could also do much in providing sound directives of guidance in the name of the commander for the chaplains in the field in their relations with the G5 and CAMG units of their headquarters and to the churches and clergy of the occupied or liberated areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of this study the following is recommended:

16. Thurmond, Op. Cit., p 9.

1. That the Chief of Chaplains initiate informal liaison with the Chief of Civil Affairs Military Government, DA, to determine possible needs for chaplain assistance and concurrence for the establishment of necessary spaces in mobilization TOEs a/o TDs.

2. That the course of action outlined in the conclusion above be studied by the Chief of Chaplains with view to adoption in the training of chaplains.

3. That the Chief of Chaplains consider the advisability of procuring and placing on file for future use a list of the foremost trusted church leaders with whom our forces might be able to work in the event of future conflict. This list should include the key clergy-men from countries in which we might be cast in the role of liberators as well as those with whom we might be engaged in hostile combat.

The End

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Summary - *Chaplain (Maj.) Robert M. Schaffell* C-22

As far back as the Civil and Spanish wars and including WWI the American troops exercised control over the civilians of the occupied lands as far as Siberia, Dalmatia and the Rhinlands. A few selected untrained U. S. Army officers were chosen to deal with the comparative simple approach to solving the civil affairs program. During WWII and its conclusion the enormous complex tasks were very evident because of the size of the countries and the size of the population.

The transition from an occupied land to that of lasting peace with orderly and stable government was no easy task. Schools were set up in CONUS, one was at Fort Custer, Michigan for training civilians and officers for CAMG work. Civilian universities were also included such as Harvard, Yale, Stanford, etc. The curriculum contained such subjects as military law, military policing, military security and also public administration, the people, geography and many others for a well rounded trained CAMG agent.

Problems arose with trained civilian components on duty. They were used as commander's saw fit within his echelon. When the war was ended they wanted to come home. Many "full colonels" and Generals wanted such positions after the war and they caused too much red tape therefore many needs were not met.

One of the most serious problems was due to the lack of a religious specialist on the CAMG staff. Since American policy permitted church services to be held, Officers with no interest in Religion often were assigned to contact the local churchmen. This neglect of the religious life left something to be desired since local problems could've been dealt with easier as local clergy and chaplains communicated.

In the Far East this problem didn't exist as much since General MacArthur's interest was directed to the people's religion and personal care.

The need for chaplains to work on CAMG staff is imperative. Chaplains must serve along with the updated CAMG Program. The G5 section can use trained chaplains who have been taught at Chaplains School or civilian universities. The principle of consideration for humanity will then be balanced-----, the body, soul and mind of the community's inhabitants must not be neglected.